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RESPONSE
AMITAI ETZIONI*

Most, if not all, of the participants in this Symposium agree with
several basic points set forth in the essay that occasioned this volume':
(1) children have fewer free-speech rights than adults, (2) children
need to be protected from exposure to violent and vile material, and
(3) such protection should be age-graded. This agreement is no small
matter given the stature of the scholars involved-and given that they
approach the problem at hand from essentially liberal or libertarian
viewpoints. The difficulties involved in tackling the issues at hand are
highlighted by the fact that Congress's first attempts to find a constitutionally acceptable way to draft laws that protect children from
harmful material in the media (cyberspace included) failed. Both the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") 2 and the Child
Online Protection Act of 1998 ("COPA") 3 have been found by the
courts to violate the First Amendment.4 The Supreme Court decided,
however, that the Children's Internet Protection Act of 1999
("CIPA") 5 is constitutionally acceptable in its June 2003 ruling on
United States v. American Library Association, Inc. 6 One could argue
that the Court so ruled because it lost hope that Congress will come
up with a truly satisfactory bill. CIPA, as I indicated in the leading
essay, is a deeply flawed law, unnecessarily limiting the free speech of
adults while exempting the material most harmful to children, specifically gratuitous violence.
It is also reaffirming that after the opening essay (in which an
age-graded approach was suggested) was written and sent to the participants in this Symposium, the Third Circuit's decision on remand
* I am indebted to Betsy Cavendish-Kellogg for comments on a previous draft, and to
Mackenzie Baris and Mark E. Gammon for editorial suggestions.
1. Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Childrenfrom Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2004).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000)).
3. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)).
4. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that CDA is unconstitutional);
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that COPA does not satisfy strict scrutiny).
5. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335.
6. 123 S.Ct. 2297 (2003).
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from the Supreme Court notes that COPA does not limit the term
"minor" in any way, and suggests that the "statute's targeted population could be more narrowly defined."7 In other words, the court
ruled that an age-graded approach might serve best to satisfy the First
Amendment's requirements.
The responding essays, however, quite clearly do not embrace
my communitarian approach, but rather seek to limit the First
Amendment rights of children in the interest of some other individual
right. That is, they stick to a rights-centered political philosophy, to
liberalism. However, apart from my concern for the well-being of
children, one major reason I explored children's First Amendment
rights is the light such an exploration casts on deep flaws in liberal
political theory and related social philosophical positions.
I.

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS VERSUS CHILDREN'S WELL-BEING

The essence of communitarianism as I see it-and where it profoundly differs from liberalism-is the observation that societies, indeed humanity as a whole, are constantly facing two profound claims.
These claims, for autonomy and social order, can be reconciled only
partially. Thus any attempts to build a social theory centered on one
of these claims will unduly deprive the other, thus minimizing or ignoring the issues that arise when one faces the two profoundly legitimate but conflicting claims for autonomy and social order. The
communitarian approach is to work through the inevitable tension,
rather than wish it away by presuming that liberty or rights are absolute and that the burden of proof lies with those who advocate deviations in the interest of other considerations. In the context of the issue
at hand, the great value of children necessitates a communal concern
for their well-being, one that takes into account their special vulnerability and need for protection, and this concern must be given full
weight when it conflicts with First Amendment rights.
Second, communitarian thinking draws on the observation that
people are not free agents whose preferences must be respected because they reflect their true selves, but that they are persons shaped,
in part to be sure, by their social and historical environments. In principle, there should be no objection to recasting these environments as
a means to improve their preferences. For instance, if commercials
manipulate a person to yearn for Marlboros, we may give considera7. ACLU, 322 F.3d at 253-54.
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tion to running public service announcements that speak to that person's fear of dying in order to urge him to stop smoking. Note that we
are talking about appeals to emotions and values, not simply sharing
information that a fully autonomous person may process. To put it
more technically, forces external to a person can influence (though
not fully determine) his preferences, and these forces command much
more respect than liberalism accords them. Liberals must assume that
people are born at age twenty-one with their preferences in place, as
Kenneth Boulding put it, because once they acknowledge that preferences are externally shaped-rather than freely chosen or expressive
of people's values-our respect for people's choices is much diminished. Thus, if the marketing departments of corporations greatly
shape what we want to buy, there is much less reason to oppose state
limitations on our purchases (say, of chemically laced foods) than if
these choices reflected our true wishes or were based on our understanding of the risks involved and our values to accept them.
Children provide an unparalleled opportunity to study the issue
at hand because nobody can seriously question that they are born
without specific preferences on most matters. While they may have
some generalized predispositions, children's preferences are largely
imported and not innate. For this reason, we do not consider it a violation if a parent prevents a child from exercising her "right" to run
into the street, nor is it a violation of her First Amendment rights if a
parent turns off the TV set and sends her to bed. Especially for infants and young children, we very properly pay relatively little mind to
their preferences, and we see is not merely as our right, but as our responsibility, to influence the development of these preferences. One
major factor, then, is control over children's educational environments, including the cultural materials to which they have access. Once
one realizes that preferences are in part externally shaped in the
young by an environment deliberately formed for this purpose, one
can readily see that the external social forces at work do not suddenly
die off when children come of age, thus pointing to the need for a
social theory that would accommodate these forces, which liberalism
does not. This issue, in other words, speaks to a fundamental problem
with liberalism as a whole, namely its inability to account for the fact
that external factors influence the choices and decisions of all people.
If one accepts that we are shaped by our communities, cultures,
and histories, it takes only one more step to recognize that adults also
are not free agents or free-standing individuals. They are shaped not
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only by constraints (which liberals have no problem incorporating
into their political theory and social philosophy as parts of the environment that actors take into account, such as costs), but also by
processes that shape our preferences in ways of which we are unaware-for instance when we subconsciously respond to cues from
those we care about, such as members of our families and communities. The same holds for religious, ideological, and other social influences that affect us not by providing information but by rearranging
our inner selves. I should be quick to note that we of course have
some degrees of freedom, but fewer than presumed in liberal theory.
To avoid facing this issue, contemporary liberal theorists rarely deal
with the unique situation of children-but when they do, they treat
children as if they are adults who happen to be short in stature- and
who have all the same rights.
Because the essays here assembled deal with children, they are
unable to ignore the profound impact of external influences on the
self. Instead, the authors resort to a rather different device to keep
their liberal beliefs intact: They seek to base whatever special treatment of children they favor on some well-established or newlyfashioned individual rights. For instance, instead of recognizing a
public interest in the well-being of children, some try to rely on the
state's (or community's) right to produce healthy children-a particularly troubling move because it accords collectivities rights, which are
best preserved for individuals. Others merely fashion new children's
rights to protection from harmful material in the media despite the
First Amendment.
One cannot but wonder why such fine scholars would resort to
intellectual contortions to base protection for children on rights
claims rather than accepting the communitarian position. An overly
simplistic answer is that they are liberals, and thus are bound to defend the political theory that undergirds their thinking. Scientists
speak of "stubborn facts," those that do not fit a prevailing theory. It
is the duty of scientists to try to stretch a theory to determine if it can
accommodate such facts before even considering a theory (or paradigm) shift. Often, theories are allowed to stand even if they cannot
deal with several stubborn facts, because the intellectual costs of
abandoning one theory and embracing another are so considerable. It
is my task, as an advocate of the "next" social theory, to convince
liberals that a shift to communitarian thinking is overdue.
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Another reason my colleagues adhere to liberal theory is that, in
some intellectual disciplines, especially philosophy, deriving a position from one overarching principle (in this case liberty) is considered
vastly superior to making contradictions reflecting the clash of two or
more incompatible principles one's starting point. In contrast, I take it
for granted that no society can survive if it tries to build on-let alone
'maximize,' as some economists aspire to do-any one principle; people have contradictory legitimate needs. Adults are entitled to full
First Amendment rights, but children need protection from some
kinds of expression. Here is a conflict that must be worked through,
and not by treating all measures taken on behalf of children as concessions adults may wish to grant against their own free-speech rights.
Thus, I differ greatly from Colin Macleod when he writes that the
communitarian position calls for ".... context sensitive politics of the
common good in which individual rights can be limited for the sake of
other values. ' 8 First, we should not assume that every time we take
something other than rights into account, we are somehow taking
something away-as if attending to any other values entails some
kind of invasion on rights' turf. In terms of the Fourth Amendment,
there is no right never to be searched; for when one is subject to reasonable searches, one's rights have not been violated whatsoever.
Similarly, children have few First Amendment rights, and thus limiting their exposure to harmful material is not a violation of their
rights. Second, as we shall see immediately, the context is relevant,
but taking it into account is derived from the principle that a good
society is one in which there is a carefully crafted balance between
autonomy and social order and not some kind of politics of the common good, or of any other kind.
Finally, and arguably most important, is the question of being
"within history." In earlier periods (say, when Locke was writing or
when he became widely followed in the founding days of the republic), and still today in other societies, the common good was well protected and rights were limited. Thus, from the communitarian
viewpoint, the main concern was to roll back the excessive powers of
the state and the church and to provide ways of thinking that would
legitimate the increased autonomy of citizens and a greater respect
for rights. Over the last decades, however, especially in the United
States, the language of rights has been overextended-and that of the
8. Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression for Children, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 55 (2004).
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common good undermined9 In the current historical context, we need
to give more consideration to shoring up the common good, and
rights inflation must be curbed. The struggle to find legal ways for the
community to protect children-and basing this protection on notions
of the common good rather than the extension of rights-is very
much a part of this overdue historical correction.
Before I proceed, I should note that the essays in this volume are
very rich, and it is regrettable that I am unable to respond to every or,
indeed, very many of the points made.
II. RIGHTS-BASED PROTECTIONS

Colin Macleod argues that liberals can accept the "political" proposals I made -especially those that involve separating children from
adults and thus do not involve "spillover" -but based on "liberal ideals of equality, individualism, and rights." 10 He argues that children
have multiple rights and interests, including some based on their developing moral capacities. Therefore, whatever limitations on harmful
(as well as "unsuitable") material might be imposed on behalf of
children can be justified by their needs, without introducing consideration of the common good. In the process, Macleod vastly expands
and enriches liberal theory in ways that he concedes in passing not all
his fellow travelers will want to follow, but he does stay within the
very broad tent of liberalism.
David Archard's argument develops along similar lines."I He de-

lineates several different children's rights-as well as the rights of
parents to direct their children's development-and sorts out the relationships among them. His most novel idea is the notion that children
have a right (maybe 'interest' would be a more suitable term) to the
future adult that they might become, if properly developed. Therefore, material that one may seek to deny to children out of concern
for their well-being may not be denied because to do so would be to
set back children's future capacities as free citizens. He argues that
children have rights not only as children, but also rights as future
adults. This latter category works two ways. It could mean that we
9. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE:
COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996); MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
10. Macleod, supra note 8, at 56.
11. David Archard, Free Speech and Children'sInterests,79 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 83 (2004).

20041

RESPONSE

should deny children access to certain types of material because they
have a right to become healthy, well-adjusted adults. On the other
hand, it also means that children do have rights to see certain material
not as children, but in the interest of becoming adults (learning how
to deal with sex and violence in an appropriate way) and having a
hand, to the extent possible, in their own development.
This is a well-taken point. If one were to assume that children
never grow up, as is the case with a child who has a truly low IQ, we
would not be concerned with the rights of the adult-in-the-child and
would be less willing to allow him to be exposed to harmful material
because he eventually must learn to deal with such material on his
own. This argument does justify taking some risks, allowing material
to be somewhat ahead of where a child is. But one should take into
account, as Archard does, that when a child is harmed as a child, the
adult-in-the-child is also likely to be harmed. Thus, if a child develops
aggressive tendencies, he is likely to follow this same course as he
grows up. The only remaining question-for me a key one-is why
this argument should be put in terms of some kind of a new right
rather than in terms of the interest of the community (and the family
and the child) to protect the child well so that she grows up to be a
good citizen and a good human being.
Emily Buss argues that children especially need free access to
different kinds of cultural material, the Internet included, because
they are still developing. 2 She does favor some regulation of material-but in order to convince uptight parents to let their children
roam more freely, which she considers essential for their normal development. However, a huge amount of data shows that most parents
are too lax, not too controlling, when it comes to their children. Ten
million children are so-called latchkey kids, living in homes in which
adults are not present after school, free to do what they wish with TV,
the Internet, and the liquor cabinet. Parents often come home from
work exhausted, disinclined to discipline their children, and relieved
when they are preoccupied by some TV show or computer game.
Practically none of them activate their V-chips. In short, regulations
can hardly be justified on this ground.
What difference does it make whether we justify regulations by
reference to the common good rather than some children's right that
trumps their developmental or free speech rights? When we refer
12. Emily Buss, The Speech-Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
103 (2004).
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exclusively to rights, we immediately face the question of which rights
take precedence over others. Because liberals tend to accord the
highest value to free speech, protection of children is likely to come
up short-as has been the case in the issue at hand. So when Buss and
others refer to the fact that the courts have taken public interest into
account in other matters, such as mandatory vaccinations, the same
does not necessarily hold true when it comes to the First Amendment.
Surely, no reliably principled reasons come to mind why rights other
than free-speech rights should prevail in liberal theory. In contrast,
from a communitarian viewpoint, there is no reason to hold children's
protection from violent speech any less dear than their protection
from any other equivalent threats that do, not involve speech.
Moreover, the rights that liberals try to balance against free
speech are often contrived claims with little tradition in jurisprudence
and public support. Viewing the well being of children as a public
good is much more readily acceptable.
III. SPILLOVER VERSUS SEPARATION

Several authors found it useful to build on the distinction between programs that protect children even if it means also limiting
adult access to some materials (that is, where controls "spill over"
into adult rights) and those that protect only children (such as providing separate access to children and adults). It seems obvious to me
that, to the extent it is practical, separation is to be preferred over
spillover for the simple reason that it allows one to have the best of
both worlds by protecting children while not violating the First
Amendment rights of adults.
Not all would agree. Some social conservatives (who focus on
pornography but not violence) would not mind one bit using the need
to protect children as an opportunity to curb adult access as well,
which is one reason that so many of the laws and regulations devised
under their influence failed when tested in the courts (and, in fact,
Buss, who is no social conservative, ends up making a similar argument). Some libertarians and civil libertarians-who believe that
children have strong, if not total, First Amendment rights-do not
appreciate either approach.
It is clear that children need to be protected one way or the
other. Given the strong commitment to the First Amendment rights
of adults, for now it is best to rely on separation. Most participants in
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this volume, especially Nunziato,13 follow a similar line of thinking.
However, there is no reason to object to a re-examination of the
question of whether adults' access to gratuitous violence in the media
should be curbed, though it is beyond the purview of this examination.
Given that children mature gradually, one kind or another of
age-graded protections should be used, rather than allowing the controls that are suitable for young children to "spill over" to teenagers.
Practically everybody agrees to this position, even Heins. The Third
Circuit, to reiterate, made a similar suggestion in reference to
COPA. 14 Colin Macleod correctly points out that it would be better to
have many more gradations. Indeed, the way to go ultimately is not to
be graded only by age, but also by the capacities of the specific child.
For the time being, however, practical concerns necessitate using a
small number of gradations, with age standing in for a more precise
measure of maturity.
IV. THE ROLE OF PARENTS
It is not reasonable to suggest that parents should regulate their
children's access to the media and no other protections are needed.
Parents in this day and age need all the help they can get. They cannot stay home at all times to control what their children see on TV
and the Internet, and they cannot pre-screen all the tapes and games
their children get hold of-hence the merit of the ratings now provided for movies, TV programs, CDs, and video games, all of which
were opposed by one libertarian or another. V-chips are a particularly
useful example of how the public can help parents to control the
amount of violence their children are viewing at home. (The inclusion
of V-chips in television sets is required by law, but, regrettably, so
little effort has been made to explain to parents how V-chips work
that most seem unaware of how to activate and calibrate them.) The
same should now hold for computer filters. Without them, parents are
very hard-pressed to protect their children.
Nunziato's analysis raises the question of whether the public
might override parental preferences, or if these preferences are the
last word because children are their parents' responsibility. A com-

13. Dawn C. Nunziato, Toward a Constitutional Regulation of Minors' Access to Harmful
Internet Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 121 (2004).
14. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 253-54 (3d. Cir. 2003).
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munitarian surely would favor providing parents with the tools and
encouragement to do their jobs, but not necessarily tolerating that the
children of neglectful parents be left without protection. Children
who grow up to be violent are a problem for the community, and thus
the community is fully entitled to find ways to reduce the probability
that children will turn out violent.
Birnhack and Rowbottom designate three levels of legal engagement with the problem: direct-public ordering, indirect-public
ordering, and private ordering. 5 My suggested solution, as well as
CIPA, COPA, etc., falls under the first category-direct legislative
action to regulate access to content. The European approach favors
the latter two-legislative "incentives" for content to be regulated at
the source, along with non-legislative social pressure for the same.
This approach works, for the most part, because of the nature of the
legal environment in Europe, where freedom of speech is recognized
and protected, but better balanced with other public interests. In
other words, Europe is a more hospitable environment for a critique
of freedom-of-speech absolutism. The European approach is evidence
that democracy can thrive and free speech can be well-nurtured even
when children are better protected than they currently are in the
United States.
V. A QUESTION OF EVIDENCE, RHETORIC AND CENSORSHIP
Heins's paper deserves special attention because it is such a fine
example of the way civil libertarians present their briefs. In practically
all such briefs I have examined, including scores of positions taken by
the ACLU on greatly divergent matters, they first argue that what
they are opposed to is not going to work, too expensive, redundant,
and so on. (In this case, they argue that evidence does not show harm
to children, that filters do not work, and so on.) If these preliminary
pragmatic objections can be overcome, civil libertarians show their
hand and then object to whatever measure is involved, whether or not
it is effective. In the case at hand, Heins argues that the suggested
filters are not accurate-they let inappropriate material through and
block appropriate material. 6 However, when told that the filters are
improving, and asked to presume that one day they would be very
15. Michael D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The European Way,
79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 175 (2004).
16. Marjorie Heins, On Protecting Children-From Censorship: A Reply to Amitai Etzioni,
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229 (2004).
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accurate, Heins and other civil libertarians object to them on the basis
of their interpretation of First Amendment rights.
The reason civil libertarians state their position this way is obvious. If a measure is defective, no one would embrace it. But on the
issue of principle, many do not share their extremism. In the case at
hand, Heins goes on and on about the paucity of the social science
data regarding the ill effects of violence in the media on children. It is
not possible here to review the hundreds of studies that show the ill
effects and to examine the methodological issues raised by themthough, granted, such issues are relevant. Instead, I cite the conclusions of those who did review the literature at great length, using
meta-analysis.
Bushman and Anderson's meta-analysis found that correlation
coefficients for media violence and aggression are roughly equivalent
to or stronger than research concerning accepted relationships in
other fields. 7 The correlation between smoking and lung cancer was
slightly greater than the correlation between media violence and aggression, but the data used for the correlation between media violence and aggression (from Paik and Comstock) were stronger than
the correlations between the following: condom use and sexually
transmitted HIV, exposure to lead and IQ scores in children, calcium
intake and bone mass, and homework and academic achievement. 8
Bushman and Anderson went on to compare some of the similarities between smoking and lung cancer, and media violence and
aggression.
First, not everyone who smokes gets lung cancer, and not everyone
who gets lung cancer is a smoker. Similarly, not everyone who
watches violent media becomes aggressive, and not everyone who is
aggressive watches violent media. Second, smoking is not the only
factor that causes lung cancer, but it is an important factor. Similarly, watching violent media is not the only factor that causes aggression, but it is an important factor. 19
Third, a single cigarette has little impact on a person's chances of getting lung cancer; however, repeated smoking (their example is a pack
a day for fifteen years) greatly increases the person's risk of lung cancer and other diseases.

17. Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Media Violence and the American Public:
Scientific Facts Versus Media Misinformation, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 477, 481 & fig.2 (2001).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Similarly, watching one violent TV show has little impact on the
likelihood of a child becoming a habitual violent offender, but the
empirical evidence now clearly shows that repeated exposure to
violent media, for example a couple of hours a day for 15 years,
causes a serious increase in the likelihood of a person becoming20 a
habitually aggressive person and occasionally a violent offender.
Hogben wrote that "[s]ome researchers and theorists still question the existence of a link between televised aggression and aggression by viewers of televised aggression" '2' despite the fact that "the
majority of both the primary and review evidence at this time favors a
positive overall effect of televised aggression on subsequent viewer
behavior. '2 2 He included fifty-six different studies, published between
1958 and 1992, in his analysis.23 To be included in the analysis, the
studies had to meet the following four criteria: (1) analyze naturally
occurring variance, (2) directly measure exposure, (3) directly measure viewer aggression, and (4) maintain a "common conceptual definition of aggression. ' 24 His analysis found that "[v]iewing televised
aggression was associated with a small increase in viewer aggression."

25

The studies that Paik and Comstock analyzed had to meet the
following five criteria:
(a) the study had to have information on the relationship between
viewing television and antisocial behavior; (b) the study had to
have a behavioral outcome measure for antisocial behavior; (c) the
study had to be an original analysis of empirical data, however collected; (d) the study had to have data sufficient for meta-analytic
calculation; and finally, (e) only one study from the same database
even when it was available from several different
was included
26
sources.

They found that there was a "highly significant positive association
for the magnitude of effect between exposure to portrayals of vio'27
lence and antisocial behavior.
Wood, Wong, and Chachere "reviewed the existing empirical research to establish whether a causal relationship exists between expo20. Id.
21. Matthew Hogben, Factors Moderating the Effect of Televised Aggression on Viewer
Behavior, 25 COMM. RES. 220, 220 (1998).
22. Id.at 221.
23. Id. at 232.
24. Id. at 226.
25. Id.at 232.
26. Haejung Paik & George Comstock, The Effects of Television Violence on Antisocial
Behavior:A Meta-Analysis, 21 COMM. RES. 516, 522 (1994).
27. Id. at 525.
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sure to media violence and naturally occurring aggression. 2 8 They
analyzed twenty-three studies and used the following three criteria
for choosing which studies would be analyzed: "(a) subjects were randomly assigned to experimental ... and control conditions, (b) the
dependent measure was aggressive acts directed toward another person who was physically present and in some cases also included aggression toward inanimate objects, and (c) aggression was assessed
through raters' direct observation of subjects' behavior. ' 29 They found
that exposure to media violence increases viewers' aggression among
children and adolescents. 0
Hearold used three features to choose which studies were included in her meta-analysis: treatment, outcome measure, and treatment comparison.31 Empirical studies that measured anti- or prosocial behavior or attitudes assigned to an experimental group and
that had a control group were included in the analysis, as were a few
film studies conducted in the 1920s.32 Her meta-analysis includes 230
studies conducted between 1929 and 1977. 33 She succinctly summarized her findings, paying special attention to those who critique the
research methodology used in studies which have found a relationship
between television and antisocial behavior. She wrote: "In the present
instance, the meta-analysis recorded that a positive effect for exposure to an antisocial television treatment and antisocial behavior is
not attributable to poor study quality or frustration or that it is confined to laboratory experiments."3
Andison noted that, although there are some problems with this
type of meta-analysis, "it seems quite clear that according to the findings of the studies collected there is at least a weak positive relationship between watching violence on television and the subsequent
aggression displayed by viewers of that violence."35 He also wrote that
"[w]e can conclude on the basis of the present data cumulation that
television, as it is shown today [in the 1970s], probably does stimulate
28. Wendy Wood, Frank Y. Wong, & J. Gregory Chachere, Effects of Media Violence on
Viewers' Aggression in UnconstrainedSocial Interaction, 109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 371, 371 (1991).
29. Id. at 374.
30. Id. at 378.
31. Susan Hearold, A Synthesis of 1043 Effects of Television on Social Behavior, in 1
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND BEHAVIOR 65,77 (George Comstock ed., 1986).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 85 tbl. IV.
34. Id. at 116.
35. F. Scott Andison, TV Violence and Viewer Aggression: A Cumulation of Study Results
1956-1976, 41 PUB. OPINION Q. 314, 323 (1977).
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a higher amount of aggression in individuals within society. 3 6 He
went on to say that "[t]herefore, it seems reasonable to tentatively
accept the 'TV violence as a stimulant to aggression' theory and to
further,
reject the 'no-difference' and 'cathartic' theories, at least '3until
7
contradictory study is completed concerning this matter.
Heins anticipated my response and thus has taken two extraordinary steps reflecting an extreme anti-scientific approach. In discussing
Wertham's study, she argues that "he mistakenly relied on correlations as proof of causation. ' 38 Given that practically all modern science is based on correlations, this move asks that we remove the
study of the matter at hand from the realm of empirical examination.
Indeed, by this criterion, as Heins herself attests, the studies that
show correlation between smoking and various killer diseases are not
evidence, which is exactly what the tobacco industry claims. And then
she goes further to argue that any scientific evidence will not do because - and I quote - "that minors overall are psychologically harmed

by exposure to sexual or violent content is unproven and probably
39
unprovable."
Heins calls censorship any limitation put on access to any
"speech" by anyone. For instance, by her definition, parents are "censoring" their young children if they prohibit them from viewing Xrated TV. This goes to the heart of the matter. Rights in general are
meant to protect us from excessive government intrusion. Nothing in
the Constitution suggests that children have First Amendment rights
against their parents. Galston reminds us that that which is legal is not
necessarily ethical and vice versa. In this case, the law, ethics, and
common sense all point in the same direction: parents have a duty to
educate, not merely teach, from the character of their charges. Ultimately, Heins agrees with me "that below the age of seven or eight, it
4
makes little sense to talk of First Amendment rights for minors."
Actually, I said twelve or thirteen, but no matter. Even she cannot
deny the need to defend children from violent material. All that we
are haggling about is the precise age limit.
Nunziato provides a meticulous and extensive analysis of the history of various legislative efforts to protect children from the media
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and the dire fate of these efforts in the courts, as one after the other
was deemed unconstitutional. Her conclusion, that the approach here
unfolded might come closer to satisfying the constitutional requirements than several others tried so far, is particularly bracing. Even
stronger endorsement of the approach followed here is implied by
Saunders's closing comments. 41 His forthcoming book on the subject,
Saving Our Children from the FirstAmendment, will do much to ad-

vance the constitutional protection of children from harmful material
in the media.
William Galston's analysis introduces a communitarian element,
although he is fully mindful of the rights involved. 42 This is particularly evident in his argument that when separation is not possible and
some spillover occurs, one is still justified in proceeding. Adults, as
members of a community and not merely free agents seeking to
"maximize" themselves (in my words), can be called upon to sacrifice,
for instance by being unable to view hyper-violent movies on TV during early evening hours. I fully share Galston's confidence that our
legal system will eventually work the matter out. However, given that
so far progress has been considerably delayed, and that Congress's
initial attempts at regulation were deemed unconstitutional by the
courts, there is room for communitarian thinkers to seek new approaches and find their place in the constitutional scheme. This in
turn involves clarifying what the constitution-a living document,
given to new interpretations-has to say about children's First
Amendment rights as compared to those of adults. The way the First
Amendment has been understood since the 1920s, the right to free
speech is more absolute than other rights. Unlike the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, it does not recognize, on the face of it, a category
of public interest. Therefore, it is much more difficult to anchor the
state's concern for the well-being of children in the First than to anchor security needs in the Fourth. Hence the need for constitutional
deliberations and interpretation. How to justify the protection of minors from the rights accorded to adults is a key subject of the papers
at hand.
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